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Knowing and judging in International
Relations theory: realism and the reflexive
challenge
INANNA HAMATI-ATAYA*
Abstract. This article addresses the notion of reflexivity in international theory through an
attempt to transcend the dichotomy between knowledge and judgement. It intends to
demonstrate that neither ‘philosophical’ nor ‘scientific’ approaches to world politics can
reconcile cognitive and evaluative claims, but that such an endeavour may be envisaged
within a certain conception of knowledge, science and facts. A comparison of Morton
Kaplan’s approach with Hans Morgenthau’s and Kenneth Waltz’s suggests what kind of
theoretical alternatives can bring together these two seemingly incommensurable orders of
discourse under a unified, foundationally reflexive epistemology.
Inanna Hamati-Ataya is Assistant Professor of Political and International Theory in the
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, at the American University of
Beirut.
Introduction
The reflexive challenge
The distinction between knowing and judging, or cognitive and evaluative discourse,
has impressed International Relations (IR) theory for several decades, along with
other related dichotomies such as facts vs. values and science vs. philosophy. These
dichotomies have become signposts announcing a parting of the ways leading to
what appears to be diﬀerent – if not opposite – intellectual investigations, whereby
diﬀerent purposes are sought, diﬀerent questions asked, and altogether diﬀerent
realities examined. While disagreements over issues of purpose, epistemology, and
ontology still fuel much of disciplinary debates, it is reasonable to consider that
the growth of (various forms of) Constructivism has made some assertions less
controversial or marginal than they once were. Today, indeed, more than a
minority of scholars acknowledge the part individual and collective judgments,
valuations, and perceptions play in the construction of at least some aspects of
reality. What still needs to be addressed conclusively, however, is the properly
epistemological question resulting from the impact such ‘facts’ have on the
* I am grateful to Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Stefano Guzzini, and the anonymous colleagues who
reviewed the article, for their invaluable comments and suggestions.
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production of theory itself. In light of the general disenchantment with ‘value-
freedom’, how, for instance, can political and international theory successfully
transcend its dual relation to the political as a reality that it needs to objectify
according to the ethos of ‘ethical neutrality’,1 while it is itself partly the product
of internalised political, economic, and cultural relations of power?2 By definition,
this and other similar questions put the subject in a reflexive posture that aims at
questioning the necessarily reflective nature of thought and action.3 For if
evaluation is part of the construction and formulation of knowledge, then the
distinction between cognitive and evaluative discourse can no longer hold, just as
the positivist separation between the knowing subject and the object-to-be-known
becomes illusory.
The underlying principle of this article is that reflexivity is not and should not
be considered a marginal or independent theoretical concern, but should rather be
viewed as a foundational intellectual and epistemic posture made necessary by the
acknowledgement of the ontological unity of subject and object, that elevates the
problematique of knowledge to a new level of questioning, best described by Pierre
Bourdieu as the ‘objectification of the objectifying subject’.4 Consequently, it is
suggested here that the reflexive endeavour can only be successful if reflexivity is
an intrinsic quality of theory, not a post hoc or parallel concern running alongside
it: the reflexive voice is one by definition, and should therefore bring together the
reflective subject with his hypothetical or real critic. For this reason, reflexivity
cannot be born out of the confrontation between objectivist and critical theorists,
since the latter unambiguously consider and treat the former’s discourse as their
subject-matter, and can therefore logically neither grant nor be granted by them an
equal degree of legitimacy. In the absence of such a mutual epistemic recognition,
there can be no intersubjective agreement, without which deconstruction remains a
unilateral, and therefore sterile, endeavour. The challenge, then, is to formulate a
theory of international politics that can eﬀectively reconcile these two orders of
discourse under a common epistemology that is capable of addressing both
positivist theorists’ concern for explanation and critical theorists’ concern for
meta-explanation, by transcending the dichotomy between ‘problem-solving’ and
‘critical’5 or ‘explanatory’ and ‘constitutive’ theory.6
Within the general preoccupations raised by some critical theorists,7 and more
specific ones that were recently voiced by scholars of diﬀerent orientations,8 this
1 Max Weber, ‘The Meaning of “Ethical Neutrality” in Sociology and Economics’ and ‘“Objectivity”
in Social Science and Social Policy’, in E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch (eds), Max Weber on The
Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), pp. 1–47, 49–112.
2 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 2005); Louis
Althusser, On Ideology (London: Verso, 2008).
3 I use the terms ‘reflective’ and ‘reflexive’ to convey the two meanings of ‘reflection’: the subject is
reflective of external structures (like a mirror is of light) and is reflexive when she reflects on her own
thought.
4 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘l’objectivation du sujet de l’objectivation’, Science de la science et réflexivité (Paris:
Raisons d’Agir, 2001).
5 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126–55.
6 Steve Smith, ‘The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory’, in
Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory Today (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995),
pp. 1–37.
7 Mark Neufeld, ‘The Reflexive Turn in International Relations Theory’, CISS Working Papers # 4
(1991); Nicholas Onuf, ‘Worlds of our Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism in
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article attempts to identify possible features of such a reflexive theory that would
allow scholarship to eﬃciently objectify its own production as an integral part of
IR’s subject-matter, and eventually ‘delineate [. . .] a research program’ that would
make post-positivist theorists not merely more ‘visible’ to the ‘preponderance of
empirical researchers’ in the field,9 but likely to impose themselves as eﬃcient
intellectual alternatives. The purpose is to show that we can envisage theoretical
frameworks that can reconcile cognitive and evaluative discourse in a way that is
neither illusory as to the pretence of science or the scholar’s interested position –
whether cultural, ethical or normative10 – nor impervious to ideological manipu-
lation;11 and to demonstrate that what makes a theory of IR successful in bridging
the gap between objectivist and critical theory is its ability to address values and
valuations as facts, and to make them a part of its ontology.
Three Realisms
Since the purpose of the following meta-theoretical demonstration is, firstly, to
illustrate the dichotomous relationship between the ideal-types of cognitive and
evaluative discourse and their equal failure to achieve reflexive thought, and
secondly, to illustrate how they can come together under one reflexive epistemol-
ogy, it is necessary to refer to specific theoretical frameworks. The three theories
here considered, namely, Morgenthau’s, Waltz’s, and Kaplan’s, oﬀer a good
material for the present endeavour, for they share enough common denominators
to sustain a meaningful comparison of their diﬀerences: the commitment to an
objective understanding of international behaviour; a conceptualisation of the
‘international system’ as the common environment of international actors;
the acceptance of states as the most significant, unit-actors of the system; the
crystallisation of power as the central reality/concept of IR, in addition to an equal
interest in the balance-of-power as the most prevalent, actual mechanism of state
interaction. If one is willing, for the purpose at hand, to ignore the contending
International Relations’, in Donald J. Puchala (ed.), Visions of International Relations: Assessing an
Academic Field (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 119–41; Robert Cox,
‘Social Forces’; Steve Smith, ‘Self-Images’.
8 Steve Smith, ‘The US and the Discipline of International Relations: “Hegemonic Country,
Hegemonic Discipline”’, International Studies Review, 4:2 (2002), pp. 67–85; Daniel S. Geller and
John A. Vasquez, ‘The Construction and Cumulation of Knowledge in International Relations:
Introduction’, International Studies Review, 6 (2004), pp. 1–6; Wesley W. Widmaier, ‘Theory as a
Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The “Pragmatist Constructivist” Lessons of John Dewey and
John Kenneth Galbraith’, International Studies Review, 6 (2004), pp. 427–45; John Agnew,
‘Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics’, International Political Sociology, 1
(2007), pp. 130–48; Vincent Pouliot, ‘“Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology’,
International Studies Quarterly, 51 (2007), pp. 359–84.
9 Robert Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly, 32:4
(1988), pp. 379–96.
10 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); Molly Cochrane, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
11 Richard Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255–300; Robert Cox, (1985) ‘Realism, Positivism
and Historicism’, in Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair (eds), Approaches to World Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 49–59.
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definitions and interpretations of what Realism is, these common features, as well
as the paradigmatic importance of Realism, should be suﬃcient grounds to justify
the a priori significance and feasibility of the comparison. As for its relevance, it
is justified by the fact that as far as the relationship between cognitive and
evaluative discourse is concerned, these theories represent three diﬀerent theoretical
models, that will be termed respectively the ‘philosophical’, the ‘scientific’, and the
‘sociological’. Since any typology emanates from a specific classificatory purpose,
these terms are meant to illustrate the diﬀerences that are specifically relevant to
the question this article poses. Therefore, and for want of a better classification
that would convey with clarity and comprehensiveness the relationships among
these diﬀerent approaches, as well as their internal complexities and richness, this
typology will be used here despite the simplifications it implies.12
Accordingly, the philosophy vs. science dichotomy is not meant to grant Waltz’s
theory and deny Morgenthau’s a certain cognitive legitimacy, nor imply that they are
not equally committed to ‘science’. Because the present focus is on the articulation of
knowledge and judgment, this dichotomy is more appropriate to qualify the follow-
ing contrast: while in the ‘philosophical’ model evaluation precedes, informs, and
shapes knowledge-claims about social reality, the cognitive discourse produced by
the ‘scientific’ model reflects a self-sustained, value-independent mode of inquiry.
Against these dichotomous approaches, Kaplan’s systems theory is qualified as
‘sociological’ because of its concern with process, not merely at the ontological level
(process as opposed to being or structure), but more importantly at the epistemologi-
cal level. By acknowledging the impact of valuations on the construction of scientific
knowledge, Kaplan’s approach introduces a dynamic, self-corrective understanding
of theory and theory-building, whereby cognitive and evaluative discourse can be
viewed as mutually informing and reassessing each other.
As these theories represent three diﬀerent articulations of cognition and
judgment, the comparison of their respective epistemologies is informative and
useful to understand the conditions under which an alignment of these two orders
of discourse is possible – and it incidentally highlights the fact that it is not the
content of Realist claims that is impervious to reflexivity, but the epistemic
assumptions of specific Realist theories (and hence, of some non-Realist theories as
well). Each of these contributions will therefore be addressed with a specific focus
on its philosophy of knowledge, the status it assigns to values, and whether/how
it makes room for reflexivity. The comparison of Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s
approaches shows that neither philosophical nor scientific models can successfully
or consistently produce a reflexive discourse in IR, and makes it possible to
reassess Kaplan’s attempt at formulating a comprehensive theory of the social: one
that is capable of objectifying judgment as both a subject-matter of science and a
factor shaping scientific production, and in which world politics and the discourse
on world politics can be simultaneously addressed as interdependent, and hence
equally significant, objects of IR.
12 The author is aware of at least the following simplifications: that the opposition between science and
philosophy cannot be asserted outside of a given philosophy of knowledge whereby these terms are
defined; that the relationship between philosophy and sociology needs a similar epistemic qualifica-
tion; that each discipline is characterised by a plethora of contending paradigms that prevents these
naked terms from being self-explanatory; and that consequently these oppositions need a whole
diﬀerent inquiry, and another article, to be fully addressed.
1082 Inanna Hamati-Ataya
Theory as moral practice: Hans Morgenthau and the political
Morgenthau’s contribution to IR theory has been so important in the institution
of the field and its main ‘paradigm’ that it still constitutes a major reference for
IR students. It is, however, symptomatic of the discipline’s own evolution that such
a pioneer should first be hailed for the ‘scientific’ value of his approach, and be
later on criticised by the inheritors of a more acute scientific awareness, that was
meant to ‘transcend the error and confusion born of an early (and thus imperfect)
apprehension of [the] evolving science’13 of IR. A contextual reading of the
disciplinary value of Morgenthau’s realism reveals its changing status in the field.14
First considered the founder of a scientific study of international politics, his work
then becomes ambiguous in light of new conceptions of scientific validity,
appearing to be both ‘philosophical and empirical’,15 until the latter qualification
is used by some proponents of positivism16 to disqualify it, thereby rejecting it
outside of ‘legitimate’ scientific discourse altogether. These diverse interpretations
obviously result from profoundly divergent assumptions regarding science itself, as
well as the many struggles for academic legitimacy that are naturally served by
such debates. It is nonetheless true that Morgenthau’s work can be assessed in
diﬀerent ways. The ‘philosophical’ model proposed here is not meant to reduce it
to a single dimension, but to signify that as far as the articulation between
knowledge and judgment is concerned, Morgenthau’s cognitive discourse is
informed and shaped by an evaluative one. In other words, judgment, values and
valuation precede knowledge, facts and explanation in the logical and intellectual
construction of his theory.
Epistemic scepticism: Morgenthau’s critique of apolitical knowledge
That evaluation comes first in Morgenthau’s Realist appraisal of social reality is
obvious in the author’s perception of power and the political in general. Judgment
precedes knowledge logically in the reader’s appreciation of his account, just as it
precedes it in his own intellectual development. And just as it is misleading to read
Politics Among Nations17 before – or without – reading Scientific Man Versus
Power Politics,18 it is misleading to assess Morgenthau’s conception of knowledge,
science, and theory without first discussing his conception of human nature, power,
and the political. The fact that the political is defined in reference to an immutable
and universal human instinct he calls the ‘will to power’19 is a foundational element
13 Robert M. A. Crawford, Idealism and Realism in International Relations: Beyond the Discipline
(London: Routledge, 2000), p. 10.
14 Michael C. Williams, ‘Introduction’, in Michael C. Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy
of Hans J. Morgenthau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 1–17.
15 Stanley Hoﬀmann, ‘Theory and International Relations’, in Stanley Hoﬀmann (ed.), The State of
War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1965), p. 7.
16 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1979).
17 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
MacGraw Hill, 1993).
18 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, 5th edition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965).
19 Morgenthau, Scientific Man.
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of Morgenthau’s epistemology, one that also shapes his understanding of human
action and his assessment of its potential outcomes. The political is thus defined in
such a way that it encompasses all dimensions of social life, and power is found
in everything that involves man’s thought and action, including knowledge and
science as such, which suggests that the production of scientific truths is considered
as a truly political phenomenon. It follows from Morgenthau’s perspective that any
epistemology that rests on an a priori separation of the faculties of thought,
judgment, and the will is self-deceptive, as it creates the illusion that objective
knowledge is a built-in feature of mankind that allows the subject to address his
object of inquiry independently of his own nature and existence. Against the
propositions of liberal-rationalism, Morgenthau’s Realism rests on a fundamental
cognitive scepticism that views human knowledge as an inherent moral and political
problem that cannot be reduced to, or equated with, the logical or material
limitations of scientific investigation. By embracing this view, Morgenthau does not
only express his scepticism towards a value-free science of politics, but also
acknowledges the contextual nature and significance of any cognitive endeavour. In
other words, political theory is not simply dedicated to the study of power in
general, but is committed to revealing the manifestations of power where and when
they are least visible. This specifically moral stand that denotes an ethics of social
responsibility20 clearly shows that Morgenthau’s objectification of the social world
is intrinsically committed to reflexivity, or, as Murielle Cozette recently argued,
that his Realism can be viewed as essentially ‘critical’.21
It is, then, Morgenthau’s philosophical, a priori assumptions about human
nature that inform his conception of the nature – and role – of scientific
knowledge, and his epistemology is thus inevitably directed against the legitimacy
and realism of scientist and positivist theories of the social. In order to embrace
‘science’ as a cautious rationalisation of human behaviour that is conscious of the
epistemic and moral limitations of thought, one has to abandon the illusory faith
in pure, absolute reason, and accept the fact that reason is always ‘irrationally’ and
‘socially determined’22 by both ‘natural’ and ‘social forces’ that shape our
behaviour and cognitive relation to the world. This ‘determination’ makes all
science conditioned, limited, unable to extend its reign to all cognitive realms, and
thereby forced to eternally coexist with other forms of knowledge, such as ‘religion,
philosophy and art’.23 While Morgenthau’s rejection of scientism is based on a
rejection of the analogy between nature and society, his position is asserted with
regards to natural and social science alike, for he considers that nature itself,
‘as the object of human knowledge, is [. . .] somehow the product of human
action’.24 This quasi-constructivist stand, however, finds its deeper significance in
the realm of social science, where ‘the social scientist as such stands in the stream
of social causation as an acting and reacting agent’, for ‘what he sees and what he
does not see are determined by his position in those streams’, and therefore, ‘by
revealing what he sees in terms of his science he directly intervenes in the social
20 Hans Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
21 Murielle Cozette, ‘Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau and the
Ethics of Scholarship’, Review of International Studies, 34 (2008), pp. 5–27.
22 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, pp. 154, 162.
23 Ibid., p. 123.
24 Ibid., p. 141.
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process’.25 From this perspective, scientism and positivism are rejected on the basis
of two natural and intrinsic flaws: the first one concerns reason itself, which cannot
be detached from man’s ‘biological and spiritual’ impulses, and can therefore never
constitute an absolute tool whereby the external world can be universally assessed
and measured; the second one concerns science in general, and social science in
particular, which cannot be detached from the overall processes of existence that
determine its very raison d’être. It follows that,
since there exists a necessary correlation between the quality of the human mind, on the
one hand, and the quality of the physical and social world, as we know it, on the other, the
irrationality of human action cannot but be reflected in nature and society and in our
knowledge of them26
and that ‘socially useful reason is socially determined reason’.27 Undeniably, these
propositions imply a genuine awareness of the need for reflexive thought.
Morgenthau’s reflexive commitment is, however, only achieved at the individual,
intimate level of the private ethics of the observer and interpreter of social reality.
While it expresses a genuine dedication to the ‘ethos of reflexivity’, his critical stand
does not oﬀer a foundation for an actual reflexive epistemology.
Reflexivity as an ethos: the inconclusiveness of Morgenthau’s critical stand
Morgenthau’s philosophical contribution to the post-war critique of liberal political
thought was in bringing back the ‘tragic’ as an intrinsic feature of the human
condition, one that concerns man as a social and knowing agent. In this sense, his
definition and assessment of the scope of the political establishes a strong, reflexive
ethos for the scholar whose task is to objectify political reality. The nature of
human thought and action as qualified by Morgenthau defines the scholar’s
subject-matter and his science together at once. This is so because the political
scientist shares with his object of study the same ‘corrupt’ essence and is, like any
other man, ‘a political animal by nature’, driven by the same ‘evil’ that manifests
itself in all social action, of which political action is the ‘prototype’:28 the impulse
for power that moves all men to use other men as means to their ends. The other
common characteristic between ‘scientific’ and ‘political’ man is that both of them
are ‘moral beings’ who ‘reflect and render judgments on [the] nature and value [of
the social world] and on the nature and value of [their] social actions and of [their]
existence in society’.29 The political scientist’s cognitive relation to politics is
therefore fundamentally based on this common and universal nature that makes it
impossible for scientific knowledge to be either natural or spontaneous, purely
objective or absolute: power is therefore the central concept that shapes both the
political and the scientific realm.
What distinguishes, then, the scholar from his subject-matter is a motivation for
‘truth’ rather than ‘power’, a Weberian distinction30 that Morgenthau poses as the
25 Ibid., pp. 142–3.
26 Ibid., p. 144 (emphasis added).
27 Ibid., p. 161.
28 Ibid., p. 195.
29 Ibid., p. 167.
30 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures (edited by David Owen and Tracy Strong) (London: Hackett,
2004).
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essence of political science, as an existential choice that is meant to help it face its
necessarily political nature. ‘Scientific man’ is not merely concerned with the search
for truth, but committed to saying truth against power – against its manifestations
and ideological appearances. This commitment springs from Morgenthau’s belief
that all political action is a ‘struggle for power’ having the tendency to hide the
true nature of its motives and objectives behind moral claims. While the fact that
‘morality serves interest and power as their ideological justification’ is true for all
politics, ‘this ideological function [. . .] has become morality’s main function’ in
international politics,31 and this fundamental characteristic of the political world
determines the role of political theory in general, that of international theory in
particular. The commitment to truth that defines the scholar’s intellectual activity
is therefore manifested as a properly social role, which explains why ‘the ultimate
decisions which confront the scientific mind are not intellectual but moral in
nature’.32
Morgenthau’s political theory is undoubtedly rooted in an axiological concep-
tion of science and the social world. It is, then, not surprising to find in his theory
of international politics a treatment of values and norms.33 This is possible because
his central, unifying concept of ‘power’ is not defined in a purely materialist way,
even when it comes to state relations. Within his own epistemic perspective, the
treatment of social values and norms can never be eliminated from political and
international theory, not only because values and norms are ontologically part of
its subject-matter, but also because they constitute the basis on which theory
defines itself against – that is, as discriminated from – its subject-matter. What
remains, then, is an eternal existential commitment that can never completely
achieve itself and has to be dealt with, over and again, by the individual scholar,
in his own ‘personal equation’34 where his dedication to science and truth must
constantly be asserted, and where the eﬀort to ‘reconcile his political nature with
his moral destiny’ can never be abandoned. Insofar as ‘one of the main purposes
of society is to conceal [the] truths [about power] from its members’, a political
science ‘which is faithful to its commitment of telling the truth about the political
world’ can never gain social respectability, and it is therefore in its own
unpopularity that it finds the indicator of its success.35
The ‘philosophical’ dimension and value-laden assumptions that are the raison
d’être of Morgenthau’s intellectual engagement were challenged by the ‘scientific’
turn in IR. His concept of the political and his definition of power have been the
main targets of his critics since the 1960s. What remains of these criticisms can be
assessed in light of the general divide that segregates philosophy from science in the
investigation of world politics. It is indeed diﬃcult to embrace the rigorous
standards of scientific conceptualisation and validity, which are thought to guaran-
tee the establishment of a ‘value-free’ science of politics, and to accept the idea that
31 Morgenthau, Dilemmas, pp. 51–2.
32 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p. 165.
33 In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau develops the notion of ‘ideology’ to account for the
axiological, moral, and normative discourse that accompanies, serves, and sustains national foreign
policies. He also considers ‘normative systems’ such as ‘morality, mores, and law’ as sociologically
important manifestations of ‘restraints on power’, similar in function to the state-led mechanism of
the ‘balance of power’. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 104–5.
34 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p. 163.
35 Morgenthau, Dilemmas, pp. 27–8.
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‘Morgenthau’s conception of “politics” is not [. . .] just an analytic device’, but ‘a
moral and political project’.36 Even those most willing to acknowledge that ‘all
social life is [. . .] power’ have argued against the analytical relevance of this concept,
on the basis that it makes Morgenthau’s propositions unfalsifiable, thereby disquali-
fying them as ‘scientific hypotheses’.37 More generally, the reliance on an ambiguous
concept of power posed as both the means of political action and its end, and on an
obscure, a priori notion of an immutable ‘human nature’ that is meant to explain
everything, is said to empty explanation of its purpose, according to a formally
‘rigorous’ – Popperian – conception of scientific demonstration.
Although I do not share all of these criticisms – most of which are grounded
in epistemic assumptions that are incompatible with Morgenthau’s original concern
– I believe nonetheless that while Morgenthau’s approach is successful in
identifying Realism’s reflexive challenge – because it acknowledges its political
nature and its relevance to scholarship – it, however, fails to answer it conclusively.
Firstly, because it does not oﬀer any empirical framework to evaluate and test the
scholar’s relation to power. Morgenthau’s reflexive discourse is limited to the a
priori identification of (the role of) valuations and these are not actually or
systematically treated as empirical, testable variables involved in social and
cognitive processes. As a result of their non-empirical status, Morgenthau’s
assertions about the role of scholarship also reduce social and moral accountability
to the scholar’s own individual subjectivity, whereby she is ultimately free to
determine whether she achieved her moral commitment, and to justify her actions
from her individual perspective. Epistemic reflexivity, on the other hand, requires
an instrument of measure that is more substantial than the scholar’s own
‘conscience’, which Morgenthau himself would not trust: it requires, more
specifically, the empirical objectification of valuations as both causes and eﬀects of
social interaction. Morgenthau’s ‘philosophical’ approach can therefore not oﬀer a
sociological assessment of the impact of values on theory, because it addresses the
problem as an individual, not a collective phenomenon, that is left to accompany
and ‘contain’ the objectification of world politics, instead of being an integral part
of it. For these reasons, and unless men can be magically made to agree over the
content of some universal a priori principles, the ‘philosophical’ model cannot
produce a truly reflexive epistemology. It can, at most, produce the kind of
reflexive ethos of which Morgenthau himself was a sincere – and perhaps
misunderstood – representative.
Kenneth Waltz: Realism as axiological scepticism
At the other end of Realist IR’s spectrum stands a contribution that belongs to
another intellectual/historical/institutional moment, manifested by the reformula-
tion of Realism’s objectivity on the basis of the new epistemological divide between
understanding and explaining. As an inheritor of the ‘scientific’ orientation, Waltz
36 Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 124.
37 Raymond Aron, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une théorie des relations internationales?’, Revue Française de Science
Politique, 27:5 (1967), pp. 837–61.
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appropriated the terms of IR’s ‘second debate’ and pursued the search for
value-freedom into the heart of the 1970s, when new challenges forced Realism to
reassert and re-demonstrate its intellectual and institutional legitimacy. Explanation
became a priority, and Waltz’s ‘Copernican Revolution’38 intended to achieve it at
the necessary price. By qualifying his contribution as ‘scientific’, this article
acknowledges Waltz’s success in producing a value-free theory of world politics
that satisfies the requirements of a positivistic analysis of a specific social realm.
The point is precisely to show that positivism and reflexivity are incommensurable
epistemic attitudes. In opposition to Morgenthau’s intellectual posture in which
evaluation precedes, and therefore, shapes explanation, Waltz’s posture starts with
a concern for explanation, and any evaluation that might appear in his cognitive
discourse is both secondary to it and detached from it.
Explanation and the standards of science: Waltz’s positivist stand
Moving from the epistemological to the ontological level, Waltz’s theoretical
framework can best be summarised in the following three main premises, which
together illustrate the author’s commitment to science-as-explanation. The first is
that the true function of theory is to explain ‘observed’, factual correlations or
‘laws’; a theory is therefore neither true nor false, and should be judged, not by its
realism, but its utility,39 which lies in its ‘explanatory power’, that is, its ability to
say why given causes will produce given eﬀects. Secondly, Waltz rejects the idea
that international phenomena can be reduced to state properties and interactions,
and his project is based on the informed opinion that the analytical method is
deficient in the study of international politics.40 What is needed, then, is a systems
theory that singles out the causes that are external to the system’s units. Theory
should therefore distinguish between, on the one hand, states and their inter-
actions, and on the other, the way wherein they are organised – the structure of
their environment, the ‘international-political system’. It follows that causation
cannot be reduced to factors that are specific to the system’s constituent parts or
to their relations, such as psychological, economic, institutional, or ideological
factors. Finally, since the structure of the system is the ‘locus of explanation’, the
study of the ‘international-political system’ cannot be moulded on the study of any
other system whose structure does not share the same characteristics: in particular,
‘national-political systems’, which are hierarchical, not anarchical.
Important consequences follow from these basic points. Waltz’s first commit-
ment to producing a truly scientific theory of international politics, similar in
quality and legitimacy to those of the natural and economic sciences, sets his
project against that of traditional political theory, which is ‘concerned more with
philosophic interpretation than with theoretical explanation’.41 Like Morgenthau’s,
traditional theory oﬀers ‘reductionist’ explanations where causation is reduced to
38 Waltz, Theory, p. 69.
39 Ibid., p. 8.
40 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
41 Waltz, Theory, p. 6.
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a single psychological dimension,42 and theory made incapable of dealing with
‘regularities and repetitions’, which is its true role.43 Keeping in mind the need to
protect IR’s autonomy as well as its status among other social sciences, Waltz’s
contribution avoided the danger of scientism by rejecting the simplistic analogy
with the natural world. It did not, however, prevent him from being viewed as a
‘positivist’ who is less concerned with the nature and implications of power politics
than with formulating an elegant and value-free assessment of international
constraints. When Richard Ashley criticised the ‘scientifically inscrutable ideologi-
cal connotations’ of neo-realism’s central concepts,44 Waltz declared his critic to be
incomprehensible, rejecting the criticism altogether as irrelevant. ‘Critical theory’
and ‘problem-solving theory’, he claimed, are two separate endeavours guided by
diﬀerent objectives: while critical theory ‘seeks to interpret the world historically
and philosophically’, problem-solving theory ‘seeks to understand and explain it’.
Insofar as Waltz is interested in explaining international politics, there is, in
Ashley’s criticism, ‘no clue about how to write an improved theory of the latter
sort’.45
Ashley and Waltz’s impossible dialogue embodies the symptomatic evolution of
IR and its complex identity, and can hardly be qualified as a ‘debate’. Ashley’s
assumptions are external to Waltz’s cognitive project, and there is no mutual
ground for them to meet. As far as Waltz is concerned, the political, philosophical,
social or properly ethical aspects of science are independent of the actual cognitive
process, and the question of the scholar’s position or role is one that can be dealt
with as a separate cognitive endeavour. Whatever the results of such an endeavour,
it also does not challenge her scientific production as such, because the standards
by which a theory is to be judged, evaluated, appreciated or depreciated, are those
of utility and adequacy. Waltz’s epistemological stand thus leads him to rule out
any simultaneous inquiry into the social and moral dimensions of either science or
politics.
From value-freedom to value-blindness: the price of positivism
The fact that Waltz is not concerned with reflexivity does not mean that his theory
is not capable of achieving it. To determine whether Ashley’s criticisms can be
extended beyond Waltz’s intellectual posture, one needs to look further into his
explanative scheme. This brings us to his principle concerning the ‘locus of
explanation’. A recurrent question in IR literature concerns the accurate qualifi-
cation of Waltz’s theory: is it truly ‘systemic’ as he claims, or is it rather purely
‘structuralist’?46 In other words, does Waltz really oﬀer us a theory that
42 Waltz, Man.
43 Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18:4
(1988), pp. 615–28.
44 Ashley, ‘Poverty’.
45 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics’, in
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism, pp. 322–45.
46 Alexander Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, International
Organization, 41:7 (1987), pp. 338–43; Martin Griﬃths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics:
A Reinterpretation (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 115–6; Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of
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incorporates systemic and sub-systemic factors into one single causal sequence, or
does he rather avoid the level of the units to fall in the opposite trap, by reducing
all explanation to the eﬀects of structure? While Waltz himself progressively
stopped accentuating the ‘systemic’ dimension of his contribution in favour of a
structuralist explanation,47 the question remains. Indeed, the very conceptual
relevance and raison d’être of ‘structure’ cannot be maintained without the
existence of a given sub-systemic level having some properties, which, in the overall
explanative scheme, are considered as ‘primary causes’.48 In fact, the main
proposition according to which structure is meant to explain why, given primary
causes, final eﬀects are to be expected that are ‘disjoined’ from these causes, implies
with logical necessity that something factual can be said about both causes and
eﬀects, something regarding their nature that can be observed objectively and
measured. And it simultaneously implies that there is an objective way of
determining and measuring whether they are indeed ‘disjoined’ or not.
On this point, Waltz’s propositions are somehow disappointing and in
contradiction with his definitions, thereby possibly defeating his primary ‘systemic’
purpose. To put it simply, Waltz says that structure is conceptually needed to
account for the discordance between causes that lie at the level of the states, and
eﬀects that appear at the international level. This discordance allegedly justifies
why ‘inside-out’ or ‘reductionist’ explanations are deficient, and consequently, why
a systems theory is needed. A proper theory is expected to explain observed laws,
and laws are correlations between causes and eﬀects, of the type ‘if a, then b’.49 To
perform its task, a systems theory rests on the invention of a ‘theoretical notion’,50
that is by definition non-factual and thus non-observable, while the independent
and dependent variables of the correlation are observed, factual ones. Here,
structural causation is said to explain an existing law, the formation of a balance
of power in the international system, or rather, ‘balancing’ understood as a state
behaviour. If ‘structure’ is needed, it is because of the discordance between the
independent variables or causes – state motivations/intentions – and the observed
eﬀect – the balance of power; the constraints imposed on states by the structure of
the international system resolve the contradiction. It appears then clear that both
states’ motivations/intentions and the balance of power have to be objective, factual
realities that can be measured and determined. However, Waltz never produces any
reliable and rigorous propositions concerning either the nature of these elements,
or of their ‘disjunction’. Drawing upon the microeconomic analogy, he thus
‘assume[s] that states seek to ensure their survival’,51 simply because it would be
nonsense to envisage the opposite. It seems that Waltz does not really need to say
more about state motivations, at least nothing more tangible that could be
presented through some facts of observation. Of course, his whole theory aims to
show that it does not really matter what states or rulers want and believe in, or
how they promote their status on the international scene, since this does not
Constructivism in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 6:2 (2000),
pp. 147–82.
47 Waltz, ‘Reflections’ and ‘Origins’.
48 Waltz, Man.
49 Waltz, Theory, pp. 1–2.
50 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
51 Ibid., p. 91 (emphasis added).
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explain the outcome of their actions. As far as IR is concerned, states’ and rulers’
attributes are therefore not worth knowing, even those that mould perceptions and
promotions of the ‘national interest’. In fact, Waltz would probably argue that
these objects do not belong to international theory, but rather to political theory (a
diﬀerent ontology) or international philosophy (a diﬀerent epistemology).
Waltz’s balance-of-power theory thus appears to be the product of many
commitments that can be understood in light of IR’s ‘third debate’, which was
partly triggered by the emergence of new non-governmental international actors
that challenged Realism’s state-centred approach,52 and by the return of economic
and cultural approaches to international conflict and integration that challenged
Realism’s focus on military power and its ‘balance-of-power’ paradigm. The
reassessment of the relevance of ‘power’ was also supported empirically by the
‘great’ powers’ inability to achieve military success against actors that had hardly
ever been taken seriously by IR theory.53 Apart from the epistemological and
ontological questions that were brought at the forefront of the discipline’s pre-
occupations, the debate also challenged the already weakened paradigmatic status
of Realism and, by extension, the academic status of IR itself.54 It is thus legitimate
to ask whether Waltz’s theory does not greatly reflect the need to preserve IR from
political and social theory, in an attempt to save what seems to constitute its
exclusive subject-matter, the ‘international-political system’ defined by its unique
‘anarchical structure’. This could explain some of Waltz’s theoretical choices. His
theory borrows from Realism enough to justify that states should still be considered
the major actors of the international system, but turns its back on their behaviour
to embrace systemism from the angle of the actors’ environment; while it denies the
merits of scientism, it moulds itself on microeconomics, thereby denying the original
and specific nature of its own subject-matter. And, in fact, this is probably where
Waltz’s endeavour is truly peculiar: it is so firmly dedicated to making IR an
autonomous, as well as a legitimate field, that it has completely separated IR’s
object from the broader realm to which it belongs – politics. This is undoubtedly
Waltz’s most unique characteristic. Because it stresses on the ‘analytical’ function of
theory, his systems approach does not oﬀer a global or unified understanding of
‘systems’, not because it is exclusively interested in the international political system,
but because it breaks – and hence practically denies – the ontological relation of
such a system to any other social system, in particular, the ‘national-political’ one.
The implicit consequence of this principle is Waltz’s boldest proposition, that our
knowledge of ‘politics’ is not relevant to our understanding of international aﬀairs.
It is interesting enough that Waltz chooses to qualify the ‘international-political
system’ as a ‘pre-eminently political’ one, where ‘political’ seems to refer to the
illegitimate use of force, which, taken in its most simplistic sense, is the antithesis
of domestic politics where law supposedly reigns supreme.55 His conception of the
political is thus completely opposed to Morgenthau’s, because he is in search of a
52 James Rosenau, ‘International Studies in a Transnational World’, Millennium: Journal of Inter-
national Studies, 5:1 (1976), pp. 1–20.
53 Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New
York: Macmillan, 1987), p. 562; Chris Brown (with Kirsten Ainley), Understanding International
Relations, 3rd edition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 34.
54 Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: the
Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (London: Routledge, 2002).
55 Waltz, Theory, pp. 113–4.
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discriminating factor that would separate the two realms and bring forth the
specific quality of the international system. But by adopting a formal criterion in
lieu of a definition, Waltz reduces both politics and power to their material
manifestations, thereby ignoring all other forms of social conflict present in both
types of realms. In particular, he denies the significance of struggles for legitimacy
and the imposition of norms, social truths, or ideological orientations, and hence
considers both systems from an exclusively static perspective, a view that has the
unfortunate consequence of being historically inaccurate56 and ‘depoliticised’,57 and
of accepting – or even legitimating – existing national or international orders.58
This position is set against that of his predecessor: by avoiding the philosophical
discourse that permeates so heavily Morgenthau’s Realism, Waltz embraces a
complete denial of the axiological dimension of politics in general, international
politics in particular. His theory is a perfect model of value-free and judgment-free
objective discourse, which not only rejects the need for some critical evaluation of
social science, but also rejects ideas, values, and norms outside of IR’s subject-
matter. The reflexive task is thus made impossible by the epistemological negation
of valuation as a constitutive factor in the production of theory, the ontological
vacuum in which values are placed, and the resulting impossibility of subjecting
these facts to equal standards of objectification.
The comparison of Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s approaches to international
politics suggests that whenever theory gains in scientific rigour, it loses on the
terrain of judgment and evaluation, and vice versa. Historically, American IR has
constantly had to make a choice between evaluative and objectivist theory. That
the debate never impressed IR in a similar manner in the UK, Canada, or France59
should be enough to posit that some factors specific to American institutional,
intellectual or political conditions are responsible for the orientation reached by
IR’s central producers. Although this lies without the scope of this article, it is
worth hinting at, since the assumed American identity of IR60 suggests that no
major epistemological ‘turn’ would eﬃciently impact the discipline’s self-image
unless brought from within, and that paradigmatic changes occurring at the
periphery of its ‘self-imposed ghetto’61 will continue to be selectively ‘imported’62
to serve the agendas and preoccupations specifically shaping American social
56 Paul Schroeder, ‘Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Reality’, International Security, 19:1 (1994),
pp. 108–48.
57 Jim George, ‘Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the New/Old World Orders’,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 22:2 (1993), pp. 197–234.
58 Cox, ‘Realism’; Ashley, ‘Poverty’; Martin Griﬃths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations
(London: Routledge, 1999).
59 Hedley Bull, ‘International Theory: the Case for a Classical Approach’, in Klaus Knorr and James
Rosenau (eds), Contending Approaches to International Politics, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1972), pp. 20–38; Robert M. A. Crawford, and D. S. L. Jarvis, International
Relations – Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2000); Knud Erik Jørgensen, ‘Continental IR Theory: The Best
Kept Secret’, European Journal of International Relationsm, 6:1 (2000), pp. 9–42; Dario Battistella,
Théories des relations internationales (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003).
60 K. J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1985); Ole Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American
and European Developments in International Relations’, International Organization, 52 (1998),
pp. 687–727; Crawford and Jarvis, International Relations.
61 Chris Brown, ‘Turtles All the Way Down: Anti-foundationalism, Critical Theory, and International
Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 23:2 (1994), pp. 213–36.
62 Crawford, Idealism and Realism, p. 28.
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institutions. Conceptually, and more importantly, the full and meaningful elabo-
ration of either theoretical orientation (philosophical or scientific) can only be
achieved at the expense of the other’s purpose, and from this ideal-typical
opposition arises the question of how theory can simultaneously embrace these
diﬀerent modes, in such a way that the concerns of critical theory are integrated
to – or even made to mould and orient – the objectification of IR’s subject-matter.
This article suggests that this can only be done if international theory considers the
discourse on international politics as an integral part of its subject-matter, and is
ready to drop the illusion that social science can ever be free from values and
judgment, whether in its assumptions, its propositions, or the social significance of
its discourse. We now turn to Kaplan’s theoretical framework to illustrate the
realism of such an endeavour.
Outline for a reflexive theory: Morton Kaplan’s cognitive project
Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics63 was for a whole decade
after its publication the most quoted piece of work in the field,64 and its author was
a major contributor to the heated ‘second debate’ that famously opposed IR’s
‘scientist’ and ‘traditionalist’ theorists. While its status of ‘classic’ has recently been
recognised,65 the philosophy of knowledge that supports and gives meaning to the
author’s conceptualisation of international politics may just as easily be ignored
today by his contemporary audience as it was by his earliest one.66 A restatement
of Kaplan’s main epistemological assumptions may help readers who are unfamil-
iar with his work understand both the underlying principles of his systems theory
and the meaning of his project, while those who are more familiar with his
contribution are invited to reconsider it from a new perspective, away from the
terms and context of IR’s ‘second debate’.
‘Systemic pragmaticism’: transcending the post-modern critique
Kaplan’s theory of international politics is based on what he originally called
‘systemic pragmaticism’,67 a philosophy of knowledge that rejects the notion of
absolute objectivity and the subsequent dichotomy between knowledge and opinion.
Against the then-leading school of logical positivism, Kaplan applied the pragma-
tist (Peircean) understanding of ‘meaning’ to scientific ‘truth’, thereby rejecting the
universality and univocality of empirical observations of both nature and society
63 Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1957).
64 John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1983).
65 As illustrated by the re-publication of the book by the ECPR Press in 2005.
66 This could be explained by the combination of several factors: IR theorists’ utilitarian focus on
Kaplan’s IR contribution, Kaplan’s segregation of his philosophical writings from his IR
publications, and the division of disciplinary labour in modern academia.
67 Morton Kaplan, Macropolitics: Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Politics (Chicago: Aldine,
1969), p. ix.
Knowing and judging in International Relations theory 1093
and embracing the situational and contextual nature of knowledge and scientific
investigation.68 While acknowledging early on the validity of ‘post-modern’
criticisms against the universal and objective status of science (scientism and
positivism as assumed by most Behaviouralists), he nonetheless reached diﬀerent
conclusions, as he believed that science remains a significant intellectual and social
activity, as long as one is ready to abandon the idea that there exists one world
and one truth about it.
Kaplan indeed agrees that absolute statements about the world are not possible.
According to him, this is so for three interrelated reasons. Firstly, there is no
particular faculty that allows men to identify, among all possible statements, those
that are ‘necessarily true’, and there is therefore no absolute standard whereby
diﬀerent propositions can be a priori diﬀerentiated from one another. Knowledge
should consequently be founded on an empirical assessment of reality.69 Secondly,
this assessment is not universal, for observation is subjected to its own contextu-
ality. The classical theory of truth as correspondence, which relies on the notion
of absolute ‘fit’, is therefore misleading, as it is oblivious to the fact that the logic
of discovery/interpretation is not separable from the contextual meaning of any
given observation at the time it is made/interpreted. Finally, the nature of scientific
activity is bound to reflect or share the nature of its main medium – language; and
since language is non-univocal,70 as well as historically and culturally determined,
the validity of scientific statements can only be established in reference to the
specific language-system in which they are conceived, formulated, and evaluated.
The only way in which scientific ‘objectivity’ can therefore have any possible and
realist meaning is if science is embraced as a ‘transactional’ activity, in which given
sets of propositions about the world can successfully be publicly communicated
across subjectivities and across referential cognitive systems.
Kaplan’s original concern was to salvage knowledge and science from the flaws
of absolutism, while protecting them from the dangers of nihilism. His systems
theory is then meant to serve just this purpose. To think in terms of systems is to
avoid as much as possible essentialist definitions of man, society, or politics
(Morgenthau) in favour of a relational one. What becomes an object of study are
the interactions of units within a given system whose limits are conceptually set,
and the mutual impact of environment and systems on each other based on the
internal properties of both. The notion of systems is then meant to replace the triad
of man, nation, and state by a unified conceptual framework allowing for uniform
empirical testing. Kaplan’s systems approach also does not segregate the inter-
national system from other social systems (Waltz), because his classification of
‘social systems’ does not rest on their structure. Moreover, it includes the dynamic
dimension of ‘process’: human and social systems in general, unlike ‘physical’ ones,
are ‘ultrastable homeostatic systems’ that have the ability to adapt to changes
occurring in them and in their environment; when faced with major external
68 This stand is anti-positivist insofar as it denies the existence of naked ‘facts’ and acknowledges the
role of consciousness/judgment in the production of truth and accumulation of knowledge, even with
respect to natural science.
69 Morton Kaplan, ‘Evolving Human Nature and Objective Moral and Political Obligation’,
International Journal on World Peace, 19:4 (2002), pp. 63–88.
70 Morton Kaplan, ‘My Post-postmodern Objective Account of Theory and Moral Analysis’, The
Review of Politics, 62:4 (2000), pp. 675–706.
1094 Inanna Hamati-Ataya
changes, they are capable of restructuring themselves from within, whether at the
physiological, or the cognitive, emotional, and moral level, but also to transform
their environment to make it more viable.71 Actors have thus more options than
‘simple learning or behavioural adaptation’ as is the case in Waltz’s ‘self-help’
system.72
It is from the possibility of relating three diﬀerent ‘multistable homeostatic
systems’73 that Kaplan’s approach emerges as one that can integrate values as
objects of study as well as factors shaping cognition. These are the individual,
social, and international systems. The following demonstration is based on an
inquiry that was clearly identified by Kaplan, but remained secondary in his
specific treatment of international politics. This inquiry is first concerned with
values and their role in the functioning and regulation of human and social
systems.
Values as facts: Kaplan’s anti-positivist stand
The first important proposition is that values in general – objectified as human
‘valuations’, or what is ‘valuable’ for actors – are part of the subject-matter of
systemic science, which is concerned with the processes whereby systems regulate
themselves. The second is that values and valuations can be studied objectively,
and are therefore not restricted to a purely philosophical, speculative, or normative
discourse on reality: values can be cognitively assessed. According to Kaplan’s
definition of ‘objectivity’, it is indeed possible for diﬀerent observers to reach a
common evaluation of human valuations, since one can measure empirically the
content of individual evaluative propositions, and thereby test human axiological
claims, at least by measuring the concordance between valuations and actions, then
possibly by establishing a hierarchy of valuations showing individual preferences.
Therefore, insofar as values can be subjected to objective, empirical testing, they
have an ‘objective status’, are ‘real’,74 and a discourse on values is consequently
possible, meaningful, and informative in the Popperian sense.
However, that values are ‘objective’ does not at all imply that they are
universal, absolute, or immutable. On the contrary, human valuations are shaped
by the processes human systems undergo just as they contribute to the regulatory
operations of a given system. In that sense, values are both ‘objective’ –
objectifiable – and ‘conditional’: they are not ‘relative in the sense of mere
preferences’, but rather ‘related to the characteristics of man, his relationship to his
environment, and his environment.’ ‘Moral analysis’ should therefore ‘respond to
the nature of the subject matter’ and, insofar as ‘the subject matter is homeostatic’
in nature, such an analysis should be founded on an understanding of the processes
whereby the human system functions, fulfils its needs, and regulates itself within its
environment, but also an understanding of the nature, rules, and processes that
71 Kaplan, System and Process, pp. 6–7.
72 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’,
International Organization, 46:2 (1992), pp. 391–425.
73 A ‘multistable system’ is composed of more than one ‘ultrastable system’.
74 Kaplan, Macropolitics, p. 39.
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govern the life of the environment itself.75 Kaplan’s main message here is that as
long as we speak of ‘human nature’ to account for individual and collective
behaviour, nothing truly informative can be said about social facts. In order to
break the tautological discourse that is produced by a priori definitions of human
nature, we need to address individual or collective ideas, beliefs, and norms from
a relational, dynamic perspective that would also enable us to test – and possibly
revise – IR’s implicit views on how human biological needs shape social
motivations and behaviour.76 It is then nonsensical and illusory to treat values as
objects endowed with a fixed, unchanging nature, and to address them without
regard for what makes ‘judgment’ possible – the human ‘system of perception’. By
leaving the ‘system of perception out of account’, absolutist approaches to values
and ethics have ‘failed to understand that value-laden activity involves a
relationship among a perceiving instrument, an experiment, and a setting’.77
Kaplan’s project is to re-establish the foundational, cognitive status of the contexts
and processes that are necessarily involved in the production of valuations, and to
relate the latter to the general processes of social life.
When addressing systemic regulation at the level of human systems, Kaplan’s
analysis rests on conceptual frameworks and empirical data provided by various
disciplines concerned with human perception and behaviour, from psychoanalysis
to the cognitive sciences. While he sketches his treatment of individual valuations
in System and Process, it remains symptomatically marginal to that of political
systems, and isolated from the text in an independent appendix (Appendix 2). One
reason for the segregation of moral analysis from the analysis of international
politics is the problem of transposing a methodology designed to address individual
human systems and sub-systems to the level of social organisation. Another reason
is related to the feasibility of such a general, empirical investigation, which is
limited in two ways. First, the diﬃculty of implementing the test experiences which
would objectively reveal the content and hierarchy of valuations. While it would be
easy to test, say, whether an individual who claims to value the general interest
more than his own really does, by observing his willingness to sacrifice the latter
to the former, it would be much more complicated to measure all the valuations
that account for individual behaviour, compare them, and follow changes aﬀecting
their meaning over time. Secondly, it is only by carrying out such experiences and
assessing their results that Kaplan’s approach can demonstrate its relevance qua
moral analysis. In other words, it is by showing empirically that values are indeed
legitimate variables that are also aﬀected by others that Kaplan’s assertions against
essentialism can be established once and for all. A systems theory of international
politics would therefore be dependent on the progress of other fields of inquiry,
such as sociology, anthropology, or social psychology.
Conceptually, Kaplan oﬀers what is needed to critically reflect on the impact of
valuations on theory: the acknowledgment of the cognitive status of (a discourse
on) values, the identification of a conceptual framework that can successfully
address them as scientific objects, and some primary theoretical notions that permit
the conceptualisation and implementation of test experiences. From here, two
75 Kaplan, ‘Post-postmodern’.
76 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, ‘Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or
Rereading’, International Studies Review, 4:1 (2002), pp. 73–97.
77 Kaplan, Macropolitics, p. 36.
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important orders of inquiry become possible and meaningful: through the study of
social systems – in particular, national and international ones – it becomes possible
to identify the place of values, valuations, perceptions, and evaluative claims of
political actors, and to search for their status in the explanative scheme oﬀered by
systems theory; through the study of man taken both as a system and an actor in
more complex social systems, it becomes possible to assess how valuations aﬀect,
and are aﬀected by, cognitive processes understood as a form of interaction between
the human individual system and the social – and natural – systems which
represent simultaneously his objects of study, his objects of judgment, and his field
of action.
A question for social science: testing ‘interdependent utilities’
In an attempt to address values – justice in particular – from a systemic
perspective, Kaplan oﬀers one notion that deserves to be central in his analysis of
social interaction and regulation, that of ‘interdependent utility’. This concept aims
to explain individual perceptions of, and preferences for, collective interests,
against the propositions of classical utilitarian theory,78 and therefore concerns the
processes whereby collective interests become valuable for the individual. Starting
from the empirical identification of basic human needs (biological and emotional),
Kaplan posits that some inter-individual relations gain significance for the parties
involved in them so as to become endowed with an intrinsic value that cannot be
consciously reduced by individuals to their own personal interests, or else these
relations would cease to exist (for example, marital love). One of the tasks of a
systems theory is precisely to study – and test – ‘interdependent utilities’, by
showing whether given collective institutions and interests indeed result from
regulatory processes that serve individual stability and development. Such a test
conceptually rests on the relation of variables specific respectively to the individual
system and to those systems that constitute its environment. In particular,
‘interdependent utilities’ depend on the structure and functioning of the individ-
uals’ biological and personality systems – manifested by their needs – on those of
the social systems to which individuals belong, and on the information that is
processed by the latter in their interaction with their environment.79 The
‘multistable’ nature of human beings thereby brings valuations into the dynamic
dimension of systemic regulation, and forces us to take into account not the mere
nature (Morgenthau) or structure (Waltz) of life, but the processes of existence as
well. Another important sociological factor must then be considered, namely, the
systemic position of a given agent, that is, the ‘role’ any individual occupies in a
given system or, more realistically, in a multitude of diﬀerent ones. According to
Kaplan, it is this factor that ultimately accounts for diﬀerences in individual or
collective valuations, since it is from a given position that any system assesses its
needs, its environment, and its relation to the latter, while this position also
determines the kind of information it receives, and how it processes them.
78 Kaplan, System and Process, p. 218.
79 Kaplan, Macropolitics pp. 43–44.
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When we move from the human to the political system, such a framework
allows us to address the question of political ‘interest’ in ways that promise to be
less simplistic than what is traditionally proposed by Realist theories. By extending
the ‘needs’ and regulatory processes of a system beyond the mere material
dimension implied in such notions as ‘survival’ or ‘power’, and by including
‘interdependent utilities’ as a fundamental element of human and social regulation,
Kaplan opens up the possibility of including objects such as norms and values in
the empirical study of national and international systems, with a greater rigour
than the discipline’s ‘Idealist’ precursors had envisaged. This study is not entirely
achieved in System and Process, but can nonetheless be partially deduced from its
main propositions and correlations, by artificially singling out valuations as part of
the ‘variables’ and ‘parameters’ identified by the author in his study of the impact
on the behaviour of given state-systems of five of the ‘six models’ of international
system he envisaged.80 Some conclusions of such a reading concur with classical
Realist claims, while others need greater conceptual and empirical explorations.
Among these is the assertion that ‘democratic’ regimes regulate themselves better
in a politically and legally organised environment, while ‘autocratic’ ones only
make it at the expense of their individuals’ stability and regulation. While this
proposition was politically meaningful in the context of the Cold War, it also has
a global significance for human development, and entails important normative
claims as well.
More importantly, and at another level of analysis, the notion of ‘interdepend-
ent utility’ is also pertinent to assess the role cognitive activities have on the
regulation of human and social systems, and to answer the ultimate reflexive
question: ‘what systems of thought – in form and content – best satisfy individual
and collective regulatory needs?’ Such an inquiry encompasses the philosophy and
sociology of knowledge in its broadest scope, and includes the inquiry into not
only the evolution of science per se, but also that of philosophy, art, and religion.
Within Kaplan’s approach, it becomes feasible and meaningful to ask how given
social systems have developed, and given preference for, given forms of knowledge;
how individuals simultaneously adhere to diﬀerent systems of thought, and how
these multiple aﬃliations contribute to the regulation of their life and of their
interaction with nature and society at the moral, emotional, and material levels. In
other words, Kaplan’s systems approach rests on a reflexive epistemology that can
lead to the formulation of some clear research programs, and can therefore
contribute to an eﬃcient objectification of individual and collective cognitive
processes.
Objectifying the objectifying subject: a systemic alternative
Unlike Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s, Kaplan’s theoretical framework embraces the
epistemic view that knowledge and judgment are interdependent human faculties
that inform and shape each other, and consequently, that a social theory needs to
transcend both a priori and positivist discourses on social reality, even at the
80 Those that include states as unit-actors.
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expense of universality. In this epistemic posture lies the foundation of Kaplan’s
reflexive thought, which needs to be explained further here. While Kaplan oﬀers a
theory in which individual and social regulation can be objectified and assessed, he
does not systematically pursue the study of the most fundamental epistemological
principle he shares with contemporary critical theorists, namely, the acknowledg-
ment of the contextual nature of objective knowledge and the incorporation of
valuations in the cognitive and social activity of science itself. To conceptualise and
carry out such a study, two particular ‘multistable homeostatic systems’ would
need to be objectified: the social scientist and, beyond him, the system to which he
functionally belongs – Science.
That the scholar and his science should be addressed as ‘systems of action’ and
not as generic ‘types’ representing a diﬀerentiated kind of social action is a very
important condition for a successful reflexive analysis of academic production. This
approach is indeed very diﬀerent from the Weberian typology adopted by
Morgenthau: insofar as systems theory rejects any essentialist definition of human
activity or absolute notions such as ‘man’, ‘truth’, or ‘science’, no a priori values
can be meaningfully superimposed on a given activity, and no given social activity
can a priori be defined in terms of values. To separate ‘scientific’ from ‘political
man’ is simply pointless here, for this distinction does not in any way tell us how
the former constructs his notion of ‘truth’, nor does it help us understand the
actual relationship between science and politics – and hence between cognition and
action – through history, that is, the collective processes that govern or regulate the
evolution of, and interaction between, these two fields of social production.
In opposition to the Weberian ideal-typical approach to scholarship, Kaplan’s
systems theory allows for a critical reflection on the axiological dimension of
theory understood as both an intellectual and a social product. Firstly, because it
acknowledges the plural nature of scholarship at both the individual and collective
levels, this plurality being a result of systemic conceptualisation. Secondly, because
it sets as the main source of this plurality the diversity of social environments, and
the diversity of positions individual and collective systems of scholarship occupy in
them. Once plurality and diﬀerence are recognised, it becomes meaningful,
legitimate, but also necessary, to study the mutual impact of valuations and
cognitive processes on each other, by addressing the scholar and the academic field
qua systems, and taking into account the nature and structure of their respective
sub-systems, those of their respective environments – such as the national and
international ones – and the positions – or ‘roles’ – they hold in them. In other
words, it becomes possible to pursue a sociology of academic production that is
not independent or detached from political and international theory, and to
incorporate this production in the ontology of a unified, reflexive theory of the
social.
Kaplan’s ‘systems theory’ is a possible candidate for such a unified reflexive
framework because it is capable of identifying as cognitive problems those issues
reflexivity is concerned with, and of defining these problems as equally ‘political’
as the issues political and international theory considers itself exclusively concerned
with. In other words, Kaplan’s approach unifies the subject-matter of IR’s objectivist
theories with that of IR’s critical theories, which is precisely what reflexivity entails.
Concretely, it is also capable of devising empirical means to assess both the
regulatory role of cognitive discourse in the psychological, moral, and political
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development of given social systems, and the regulatory role of political discourse
and action in the development of (specific forms and fields of) knowledge. The
notion of ‘interdependent utility’ thereby enables us to ask – and operationalise –
some fundamental reflexive research questions, by addressing the relationship
between specific modes of thinking or cognitive ideologies and given public policies
or political ideologies. In this way, the three ‘homeostatic multistable systems’ that
are the individual, the social, and the international system can be related so as to
reveal how valuations inform cognition and how knowledge informs evaluation.
Because of his implicit idea that no meaningful ‘philosophical truths’ can be
revealed independently of an empirical investigation of social reality, and his
consequent rejection of a priori principles, Kaplan provides a theoretical frame-
work that makes possible an ‘objectification of the objectifying subject’ that
embraces interdisciplinarity at the epistemic level and embraces the unity of the
human condition at the ontological one. Through its unification of thought,
judgment, and action, his approach stands as conceptually antagonistic to
Morgenthau and Weber’s, for it denies the existence of a unique ‘type’ of scholar
motivated by a unique value – truth – and unequivocally distinguished from the
‘man of action’. It nonetheless serves both Morgenthau and Weber’s original
preoccupation – to protect scholarship from the ideological tensions of social
activity – by enabling the empirical identification of the actual dangers that
confront scholars in their real social setting, and the many real situations and
contexts presiding over the production of an institutionalised knowledge of world
politics. It therefore oﬀers a satisfactory alternative for all the scholars who are
particularly concerned with the moral dimension of scholarship, as it gives
empirical grounding to the ethics of truth that they espouse. But more importantly,
Kaplan’s model in fact provides a way out of the Weberian dilemma mentioned
earlier: since absolute, universal knowledge is impossible and since theory itself is
bound to reflect and bear the weight of actual relations of power, ‘scientific man’
can never really achieve the segregation that is required for him to confront with
‘truth’ ‘political’ man’s power-driven discourse, judgments, and actions; what
scholarship can do is speak with a realistic reflexive voice that unites the scholar’s
‘ethics of truth’ with her ‘ethics of responsibility’ while being aware of, and
constantly striving to reduce, its own limitations. Kaplan shares with critical
theorists an ‘activist’ approach to knowledge – albeit not a specifically Marxian one
– embracing the principle that the world cannot be changed unless it is understood,
and that it cannot be understood unless the impact of existential reality on
knowledge is empirically revealed. His philosophical attitude therefore produces a
serious and workable model for those of us who wish to uphold this principle,
because it satisfies the fundamental condition for any theory to be reflexive:
the conceptualisation of the epistemic interdependence between knowledge and
judgment.
Conclusion
Among the many reflexive questions scholars may ask, the ultimate interrogation
that concerns IR is the following: how is theory itself aﬀected by the cultural,
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normative, and material characteristics of the international system, and the position
of IR theorists within it? If empirical assessments of disciplinary production across
cultural areas lead to the identification of structural factors that explain diﬀerences
in cognitive assessments of world politics, then IR has to take these ‘geographies
of knowledge of world politics’81 into consideration and understand how they
aﬀect its own intellectual, social and moral status.
This article shows that Kaplan’s systems theory, among other possible ones,
allows for such a conceptualisation of scientific production, for it attempts to
objectify the processes governing mental and social regulation, which necessarily
include the variables of time and space, and therefore makes room for history and
culture as essential factors in the production of thought. It also shows that
Kaplan’s model is successful because it satisfies three important conditions for the
realisation of the reflexive task: the rejection of the epistemological dichotomy
between subject and object, the rejection of the ontological dichotomy between
facts and values, and the inclusion of values as empirical factors shaping both
behaviour and cognition. For those theorists who are willing to ‘problematize’ the
‘relationship between the social world and the social construction of meaning’82
and to address themselves as products as well as producers of a knowledge that is
itself contextual, contextually purposeful, and political in essence, the ‘sociological’
model needs to be embraced at the expense of both ‘philosophical’, a-historical
discourses on politics, and ‘scientific’, universalistic ones. As shown here, while the
philosophical approach fails to unify its axiological and objectivist claims into a
uniformly rigorous discourse on world aﬀairs, the scientific position, in turn, fails
to justify its axiological or normative claims because its epistemology is incapable
of subjecting them to a common standard of validity.
Beyond the intellectual challenge addressed here, these conclusions may be
completed by institutional considerations as well. Indeed, whenever the scientific
approach is associated with the very identity – and survival – of IR,83 reflexivity
will remain marginal and contested where it is most needed. The question of IR’s
autonomy arises again. Critical theory calls not for an autonomy that intellectually
and institutionally segregates IR from other social sciences, but one that discrimi-
nates it from other social fields, especially political ones.84 The concern for
reflexivity thus challenges the meaning of many IR theories, by forcing us to
reconsider the opposition between theory and meta-theory. For if it can be
empirically established that the structure of international power relations causally
aﬀect IR theory as an intellectual and institutional production, then it necessarily
follows that meta-theory, understood as the ‘discourse on IR theory’, becomes
itself a ‘discourse on international politics’. Reflexivity would then be more than
just a personal choice motivating research and occasionally challenging paradig-
matic and discursive practices: it would have to be viewed as a necessary, built-in
requirement of ‘normal science’.
81 Agnew, ‘Know-Where’.
82 Guzzini, ‘Reconstruction’.
83 Smith, ‘Self-Images’.
84 Pierre Bourdieu, Les usages sociaux de la science: pour une sociologie clinique du champ scientifique
(Paris: INRA, 1997) and Science.
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